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The state, wage-fixing and labour market 
reform: some international perspectives 
* Jonathan Boston 
This ,article eX;plores three main issues. First, it examines the changes which have 
occurred i.n the nature and scope of state intervention in pay fixing within the :OECD 
during the past two decades. Second, it outlines .the strategies which have been adopted 
recently by many western govern1nents to enhance wage flexibility and im.prove the 
operation of labour markets. Third, it critically assesses the merits of the Calmfors-
Driffill thesis concerning the re/,ationship between wage bargaining systems ,and 
mac~oeconomic performance. It is argued ,that there are good theoretical reasons as well as 
som.e strong empirical .evidence to support the Calmfors-Driffill thesis, but that 
bargaining structur.es ,are only one of a multitude of factors which influence economic 
outcomes. 
Introduc·tion 
Public policy with respect to labour relations and wage-fixing in New Zealand has 
undergone som~ething of a minor revolution in recent years. Attempts at controlling 
nominal and Jieal wage growth by means of statutory incomes policies - which were a 
prominent ~eature of macroeconomic policy in the 1970s and early 1980s - have been 
abandoned. Instead, the Labour Government has relied primarily on 'monetary policy, and 
to a lesser ~extent fiscal policy, in its efforts to reduce the rate of inflation. At the same 
time, it has introduced a series of supply-side measures designed to ·enhance t.he flexibility 
of the labour market and thereby improve the overall performance of the economy. There 
have been major refouns to indusuial relations legislation in both the public and private 
sectors. Job training programmes have been redesigned and expanded. The tax system has 
been overhauled with the objective, amongst other things., of increasing work incentives. 
And various measures have been introduced to enhance lhe occupational and geographical 
mobility of labour. 
The purpose of this article is to explore how these developments relate to the 
cxperienoe of other OECD countries during the past decade or so.. Thr·ee topics will be 
given particular attention. First, what changes are ~evident within the OECD with respect 
to the pattern of state intervention in the wage-fixing process? Has there been a general 
abandonment of incomes policies, or is it rather that the nature and scope of incom~es 
policies have changed? Second, how widespread is the quest for labour market refouu, 
especially attempts at increasing wage flexibility? And third, ·what does the evidence 
• Public Policy Group, Victoria University of Wellington. 
122 Jonathan Boston 
suggest about the relative merits of different wage-fixing arrangements? In particular, are 
Calmfors and Driffrll (1987) correct in their judgement that the best wage-fixing systems, 
at least from a macroeconomic perspective, are those with ,either highly centralised or 
highly decentralised bargaining arrangements? And if they are, what implications does 
this have for the future direction of New Zealand labour relations? 
State intervention in the process of wage-fixing 
It is sometimes suggested that whereas the 1970s marked the heyday of incomes 
policies and interventionism, the 1980s has been the decade of monetarism. For example, 
it is argued that in most OECD countries finn, non-accommodating monetary policies 
have replaced wage and price oontrols as the chief weapon for tackling inflation. Further, 
it is pointed out that many governments, particularly of a conservative or New Right 
disposition, have abandoned attempts at winning 'trade union support for wage restraint and 
have instead sought to reduce union power, both in the labour market and in the political 
domain generally. It is also suggested that corporatist arrangements (Crouch 1977; 
Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979), which have long been a central feature of Scandinavian 
and Austrian labour relations, have begun to disintegrate (Lash, 1985). How valid is this 
intetpretation? 
It is certainly true that incomes policies were widely employed during the 1970s as an 
instrument for curbing inflation and unemployment. Throughout this period governments 
of varying political persuasions ~esorted to some fo1 111 of direct intervention in the process 
of wage and price detettuination in the interests of economic stability (Flanagan, Soskice 
and Ulman, 1983; Marks, 1986; Van Ginneken, 1987). Statutory wage controls wer~e 
imposed in Belgium (1976), Britain (1973-74), Canada (1975-78), Denmark (1976-80), 
the Netherlands (1976), New Zealand (1971-77), Norway (1978-79), Portugal (1974-75), 
and the United States (1971-73), to mention but a few examples. Voluntary wage deals of 
a bilateral or tripartite kind were negotiated in numerous OECD countries including 
Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway and Spain. 
Various forms of wage indexation were experimented with in Australia, Denmark, Greece, 
Israel, Italy, and Spain. Moreover, most governments resorted at some stage during the 
1970s to price controls of one for1n or anolher, and attempted to reduce wage settlements 
by means of indicative guidelines, moral suasion or political pressure. 
However, the suggestion that the 1980s have brought an abrupt and radical ~change in 
macroeconomic policy with a general abandonment of incomes policies within the OECD 
is not sustained by the evidence. For example, during the past eight years or so incomes 
policies of either a statutory or negotiated variety have been used in no fewer that 14 
OECD countries- Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand., Norway, Spain and Sweden. Further, .most 
governments have made determined .efforts to restrain wage settlements in the public 
sector, partly for fiscal reasons and partly so as to ~exert an indirect influence on private 
sector settlements. At the same time, two important changes in public policy ar~e evident. 
First, there has been a general shift in emphasis in macroeconomic management during 
the past decade. Whereas in the 1970s incomes policies bore much of the brunt of 
controlling inflation, with monetary and fiscal policies playing a secondary role, during 
the 1 980s the pattern has been reversed. Now most governments, be they conservative, 
liberal or social democratic, are relying primarily on finn monetary and fiscal policies to 
keep inflation in check. Incomes policies have thus become essentially supp'lementary 
instruments of macroeconomic management. Moreover, with the problems of high 
inflation after the first and second oil shocks having been largely overcome in most 
OECD countries (with a few notable exceptions) the role of incomes policies has changed 
somewhat During the 1970s and early 1980s, incomes policies were generally used on a 
short-tenn basis as a means of assisting the process of disinflation by breaking thfough 
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wage-price and wage-wage ratchets and curbing inflationary expectations. In this context 
they were seen, at least in part, as an instrument for reducing the transition costs - in 
terms of lower output and employ·ment - normally associated with a disinflationary 
macroeconomic strategy (Boston, 1984, pp.44-46). In more recent years incomes policies 
have been used increasingly as an instrument for restraining the growth of real wages and 
thereby facilitating faster employment growth. Such a strategy has been central, for 
example, to the policies adopted in Australia, Denmark, Gr~eece, the Netherlands and 
Norway during the past few years. 
Second, some conservative governments, most notably the Thatcher and Reagan 
administrations, have fh 1nly rejected any attempt to influenc·e the level or pattern of wage 
settlements in the private sector by direct means. This is because they believ.e that such a 
strategy is unnecessary as well as being both ineffective and inefficient It would be 
ineffective in that it is likely ·merely to suppress inflationary pressures for a temporary 
period. Once the controls have been lifted there would be a r~ebound effect with nominal 
wage growth accelerating and wage levels returning to what they would have been in the 
absence of the incomes policy. Such intervention would also be inefficient, or so it is 
claimed, because it ·would prevent relative wages adjusting in response to the forces of 
supply and demand. Whether such arguments are valid will not be explored her·e. Suffice 
it to say that the empirical evidence is conflicting and that, because of a variety of 
economic, political and industrial relations considerations, incomes policies are difficult to 
implem~ent success£ully on a long -tenn basis. As a result, most state interventions in the 
wage-fixing process tend to be of a short-te11u and rather ad hoc nature. In this respect the 
1980s have been little different from the preceding decade. 
Of course, any attempt to classify or categorise such interventions or to group 
countries according to the type of incomes policy in operation (or lack of it) is beset with 
difficulties. 'To start with, incomes policies vary greatly in their nature, scope and impact. 
Depending on the liberality of the definition adopted they might include anything from a 
simple., state-sanctioned but unenforceable wage guideline 1.0 a complex set of institutional 
arrangements and policy tradeoffs of either the Austrian or Australian variety. To 
compound problems, government policies are constantly changing. Hence, while it might 
be justified U> locate a particular country in a ~certain class or category at a given moment, 
such a classification may quickly lose its validity. Despite these difficulties, it ~can be 
argued that, in very broad tenus, four main groupings can be discerned during the 1980s. 
1. Countries with no formal incom.es policy 
First, there are those countries, such as Britain, Canada, Switzerland and the United 
States, where wage bargaining is largely decentralised and where governments since the 
late 1970s have eschewed any foa na of intervention in the system of wage deteunination, 
at least with respect to the private sector. Thus, they have avoided wag~e controls, bilateral 
or uipartite deals, wage-tax tradeoffs and compulsory arbitration, and have relied aln1ost 
exclusively on monetary and fiscal policies to restrain nominal and real-wage growth. 
2. Countries with bilateral or tripartit·e wag·e-fixin,g forums 
The next category which can be identified are those countries in which there are regular 
(usually annual) consultations either of a bilateral (employers and unions, or unions and 
the government) or tripartite nature (unions, employers and the government) to discuss the 
overall economic situation and the general level of wage settlements that would be 
appropriate in the light of the government's macroeconomic strategy and policy 
objectives. Such consultations .may or may not produce an agreement on a wage guideline 
for the forthcoming negotiating round. 
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Needless to say, there is considerable variation within this category. In Sweden the 
consultations have tended to be of a bilateral (employers and unions) rather than a tripartite 
nature, though fonnal government involvement has increased during the past decade as the 
country's economic problems have intensified (Lash, 1985). Interestingly, in 1984 the 
Swedish employers' organization SAF broke the 50-year o.ld tradition of highly centralised 
wage bargaining and demanded that negotiations occur only at the company level. 
C~entralised bargaining has subsequently been fesumed. In Japan there is a National 
Economic Confelience (Sanrokan) each year just prior to the commencement of the annual 
wage round (what is often termed the "Spring Offensive") (Van Ginneken, 1987, p.383). 
This ~Conference was initiated in the wake of the first oil shock in 1974 and has since 
become an important feature of the bargaining process. A similar arrangement, known as 
"concerted action", existed in West Genuany £or many years but fell into disuse during the 
late 1970s (Hudson, 1980). Since then the peak organizations of labour and capital have 
continued to maintain an on-going dialogue with ministers and government officials, but 
for1nal consultative arrangements have not been reinstated. An im·JX>rtant feature of the 
West Geuuan wage-fixing system is the emphasis put on coordinated action by employers 
and unions and the general synchronization of wage settlements (Crouch, 1985, pp.l27-
137). 
Without doubt the most sophisticated and enduring forums for multi-lateral interaction 
and policy coordination continue to be those in Norway and Austria. In Norway the main 
body concerned with inter-sectoral consultation on macfoeconomic issues is known as the 
Contact Committee (Addison, 1979, pp.78-86; Flanagan, Soskice and Ulman, 1983, 
p.l71-173). This was fanned in 1962 f:ollowing a brief but rapid acceleration in the rate 
of inflation, and includes ministers, union and employer leaders, and representatives of the 
agricultural and fishing industries. Since 1965 the Contact Committee has been serviced 
by an expert group of economists, initially known as the Aukrust Com.mittee - after its 
frrst chairperson - but subsequently feferred to as the Technical Reporting Committee on 
the Income Settlement (TRC). The role of the TRC is to provide a detailed analysis of 
the economic situation and expected developments, and in the light of this to indicate the 
likely impact of alternative wage paths or settlement levels. This analysis is then 
considered by the Contact Committee in preparation for the commencement of the 
forthcoming wage round. At this juncture a range of strategies may be adopted. For 
example, all the parties may agree to negotiate what have been referred to as "combined 
settlements". These involve a central agreement on contractual wage increases (usually 
with some allowance for wage drift), together with changes in various government 
policies, such as tax policy, industry assistance and social policy (Schwerin, 1980). 
Alternatively, the peak organizations of labour (L~O) and capital (NAF) may undertake 
bilateral negotiations on contractual wage incfeases against the background of government 
guidelines presented to the Contact Committee. If the parties fail to reach an agreement, a 
mediator is brought in and given a short time to effect some accommodation. If this also 
fails then the parties will generally take industrial action. From time to time the 
government has intervened at this point and imposed compulsory arbitration. ~on rare 
occasions it has also introduced temporary wage and price controls. 
This system of centralised negotiations dealing with wages and other economic and 
social issues has continued now for more than a quarter of a century. The pattern in recent 
years exemplifies the variation in possibl~e policy outcomes outlined above. In 1985 the 
LO and NAP agreed that there would be no general wag~e adjusunent, except for certain 
low-wage sectors. This meant that bargaining occurr~ed primarily at a decentralised level. 
In 1986 the parties had considerable difficulty reaching an agreement at the central level. 
Eventually, after a major strike in the public sector and a lockout in the private sector a 
deal was worked out whereby wage increases of 2-3% were agreed for the private sector 
with somewhat higher increases for public sector employees,. In exchange for an 
acceptance by the unions of a relatively small wage rise, the employers agreed lo a 
reduction in working hours from 40 hours to 37.5 hours from the beginning of 1987. 
-- - - . . . -- - ----
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Given 'the impact on labour costs as a result of this move, the parties decided that there 
would be no general wage increases during 1987-88. In return for this the government 
promised to refottn the tax system., partly to make it more equitable and partly to preserve 
real disposable incomes. 
It remains to be seen how much longer the current bargaining arrangements will 
survive in Norway. The system is undoubtedly under pressur~e. To start with, the LO's 
dominant position as the principal representative of organised labour is gradually being 
undettnined as a fesult of the founation of new, independent unions. These unions tend to 
be unsympathetic to the LO's traditionally moderate stance and are less committed to the 
pursuit of consensual incomes policies. If this tr~end continues, the LO may soon be 
unable to command the support of rank-and-file workers and the system of centralised 
negotiations and combined settlements may be jeopardised. Quite apart from this, there 
has been a significant change in the relative importance of centralised and decentralised 
bargaining during the past two decades. In the 1970s, roughly two-thirds of the awegate 
movement in wag~e .rates in the private sector was determined through contractual 
agreements reached between the LO and the NAF, the remaining third arising from wage 
driit at the plant or enterprise level. By the mid-1980s the proportions had been virtually 
feversed (OECD, 1985, p.20). Effectively, therefore, power is shifting from the national 
and industry level to the enterprise level. 
The o'lher feature of Norwegian incomes policy which is worth noting is the gradual 
mov~e away from its earlier emphasis on a solidaristic or egalitarian ethos.. In accordance 
with the 85% rule which was in force between 1980 and 1984, the lowest paid employees 
in each industry (or branch) had to be paid at least 85% of the average .industrial wage. 
'The aim of this policy was to protect the position of low-paid workers and reduce skill 
differentials. But, as many expected, this approach was r~esisted by skilled ~employees and 
tended 'to exacerbate the degree of wage drift. In the mid-1980s, therefore, th~e rule was 
modified to facilitate greater wage flexibility. As it currently stands, the rule requires that 
average ·wage rates in each industry must be at least 85% of the average industrial wage. 
In Austria, collabouration between the government, unions and employers over 
macroeconomic issues, social policy and wages policy began shortly after the Second 
World War. Following the surg~e in the rate of inflation in the mid-1950s, which 
heightened fears of a retwn to the hyperinflation and political instability which had 
characterized the 1920s, the union movement sought the establishment of a consul'tati ve 
forum to restrain price rises and ensure that real wages wer~e protected. This led to the 
creation of a Parity ~Commission for Wages and Prices in 1957. Initially it was intended 
to be a temporary body, but the arrangement proved so successful that the Parity 
Commission has remained in ~existence for more than three decades (Dunkley, 1984; 
Flanagan, SoSkice and Ulman, 1983, pp.40-82; Marin, 1985; Mire, 1981; and Prager, 
1981). 
The Com:mission is a voluntary, multi-lateral organization ·with representatives from 
the government, the Chambers of Commerce, Agricultur~e and Labour, and the trade union 
movemenl It is chaired by the Federal ·Chancellor and meets monthly. A wide range of 
matters of mutual interest are discussed, including economic, social and industrial relations 
issues. Most of the detailed work of the Co·mmission is undertaken by its three sub-
committees: the Sub-Committee on Prices, the Sub-Committee on Wages., and the 
Economic and Social Advisory Board. Of these the Sub-Committee on Wages is the most 
important It meets fortnightly and its decisions must be unanimous. It does not, 
however, hav.e any legal powers and must rely on moral suasion to achieve its objectives. 
The Sub-Committee has two important roles in the wage-fixing process. First, it 
provides a forum within which the peak organisations of labour and capital can evaluate 
the economic situation and can seek to reach a consensus on the overall level of wage 
growth that is appropriate and sustainable (i.e. given certain objectives with respect to 
inflation, employment and international competitiv~eness). Second, any union vlishing to 
commence bargaining over wages and conditions cannot proceed until it has obtained the 
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approval of both the central union organisation (OOB) and the Sub-Committee . The latter 
body has six weeks to arriv·e at a decision. If it fails to do so, the matter must be put 
before the Parity Commission, which also has six weeks to reach an agreement. If at the 
end of this period the Commission r~emains undecided, the union can commence its 
negotiations with employers. Through these procedures the central organisations of 
labour and capital are able to influence both the timing and to some extent the size of pay 
• 1ncreases. 
Austrian unions rarely ignore the Commission's infonnal guidelines and its directives 
with fegard to the commencement of wage negotiations. Nevertheless, as in Norway, the 
peak organisations hav~e difficulty controlling the level of wage drift at the enterprise lev~el. 
This appears to be the achilles' heel of centralised wag~e-fixing systems and corporatist 
incomes policies. In the Austrian case, however, it has not as yet threatened the integrity 
of the current institutional arrangements. One reason for this lies in the substantial 
control which the national unions are able to exeficise over the activities of the works 
councils within individual enterprises. A more serious problem in the future, therefore, 
may arise from the growing dissatisfaction at the grass roots level with the highly 
centralised nature of decision making in Austrian unions (Duda and Todtling, 1986, 
pp.263-265). How the union leadership responds to such pressures, in particular the quest 
for greater democratic control, remains to be seen . 
3 . Countries with incomes policies fas·hioned by inde·pendent 
arbitral bod·ies. 
A third category of countries are those with incomes policies in which a central role is 
played by an independent arbitral body. The best example of such a system at present is 
Australia, though New Zealand also fell into this category during the 1950s and 1960s. 
The Australian syste.m of conciliation and arbitration, which was modeled on the 
pioneering refouns in New Zealand in the late 19th century, came into being in 1904 and 
has continued, with various .modifications, ever since. The central coordinating and 
decision-making body is the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
(ACAC). In the past few decades, this has played an increasingly important role in the 
wage-fixing process and as a vehicle for achieving the government's stabilisation 
objectives. For example, between 1975 and 1981 the A~CAC was responsible for 
implementing a highly centralised wage indexation policy (Plowman, 1982). This 
strategy began to disintegrate in the early 1980s and for a brief period the country returned 
to a fo1 na of decentralised pay bargaining. 'The result, in short, was a significant 
acceleration in the rate of wage inflation. This in lurn prompted the Fraser Gov~emment to 
impose a wage freeze in December 1982. 
Since March 1983 wage-fixing in Australia has been dominated by the Labour 
Government's Wage Accord with the Australian ~council of Trade Unions (ACTU). The 
Accord, which was devised while the Labour Party was in Opposition, has two main 
components: a commitment to centralised wage-fixing based on the ACAC and in 
accordance with which wag~es are linked primarily to price increases and changes in 
productivity; and a consultative approach to economic management in which the unions, 
employers and other interest groups have the opportunity to ex~ercise a significant 
influence on important matters of public policy (Burch, 1985; Gerritsen, 1986; Mulvey, 
1984; Stewart, 1985; Singleton, 1985). Despite widespread expectations that the Accord 
would quickly collapse and that centralised wage detennination would be undermined by 
the activities of militant trade unions, d1e pay-fixing machinery put in place in mid-1983 
has remained largely intact. 
There have, of course, been some important changes to the policy framework during 
the past ~ew years. Indeed, to date three separate phases of the policy can be identified. 
Under the principles agreed in mid-1983 - Le. Mark I of the Accord -a system of wage 
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indexation was introduced whereby the Arbitration Commission granted 6-monthly ·wage 
adjustments of a unifo1111 percentage amount (OECD, 1984, pp.54-57). These were based 
on movements in the CPI during the pr~eceding 6 months. In addition, the parties agreed 
to defer consideration of claims based on national productivity movements until 1985, 
with work value claims being deferred until February 1984. In order to be eligible to 
receive national pay increases awarded by the ~Com·mission, each union was obliged to 
give an undertaking that it would not pursue extra claims outside the scope of the policy 
principles. 
During the spring of 1985 the Labour Government reached an agreement with the 
ACTU on Mark II of the Accord (Pelridis, 1986). The new set of principles was 
developed against the background of a substantial devaluation of the Australian dollar and a 
general desire to ensur~e that 'this did not trigger a renewed burst of inflation. There was 
also a widespread recognition that real wages ·would have to fall in the short run if the 
~Government's objectives with respect to international competitiveness and employment 
growth were to be fulfilled. Giv,en these considerations, it was agreed that, although the 
national wage case in September 1985 would be based on full indexation, this practice 
could not continue during 1986. Full indexation would be temporarily suspended. The 
net result was a fotnaula whefeby the Arbitration Commission would award a general wage 
increase in the early part of 1986 based on the CPI movement in the 6 months to the end 
of 1985, minus 2 percent. In the ~event, the decision of the Commission was delayed until 
June 1986; the actual increase awarded was 2.3 percent. In addition to the agreement on 
discounting, the ACTU also accepted the need to delay further its quest for pay increases 
based on productivity gains. It did, however, secure an agreement from the Government 
that tax cuts would be implemented during 1986 to help preserve real disposable incomes. 
During the latter part of 1986 there were growing pressures from both employers and 
b·ade unions, for some modification of the indexation principles to fac:ilitate greater wage 
flexibility, and in particular to provide more scope for bargaining at a decentralised level 
(Petridis, 1987). For example, at the national wage case in November 1986 the A~CTU 
called for the inlfoduction of a two-tier wage system. Under ·this there would be two ·flat 
wage increases for all workers during 1987., together with decentralised bargaining up to 
some agreed amount. 'Th,e e·mployers also favoured a two-tier system, but argued that 
there should be only one general wage rise awarded during 1987 and that both this and any 
second-tier movements should be based on capacity-to-pay arguments, rather than on 
relativity or CPI considerations. In December 1986, the Arbitration Commission decided 
to tetaninate the centralised wage indexation regime and introduce a two-tiered system. 
However, it left the details of the new wage-fixing arrangements to be determined by an 
all-party conference in January 1987. Eventually it was decided to that there would be a 
flat :rate pay increase of $10 in March 1987 with a further pay rise of up to 1.5 percent 
permitted in October 1987. On top of this, unions were free to bargain with their 
employers for wage increases of up to 4 percent. 
4. Countries in which incomes poHcies continue to b ~e employed for 
temporary periods 
The last category are those OECD countries without pe1naanent, centralised wage-fixing 
machinery of a bilateral, tripartite or arbitral kind but in which incomes policies of one 
foun or another have been implemented during the 1980s. Such countries include 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland., Ireland, ltal y, the Netherlands and 
Spain (Van Ginneken, 1987). For ~example, s·tatutory incomes poHcies were imposed in 
Denmark (1985-86), France (1982), Glieece (1985-87) and Iceland (1983-84). There have 
also been comprehensive bilateral or tripartite agreements in Belgium (1986), Iceland 
(1986), Italy (1983-85), the Netherlands (1982) and Spain (1984). 
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A prominent ~eature of the first half of the 1980s was the attempt of many OECD 
countries to modify, suspend, or tenninate altogether 'the various systems of automatic 
wage indexation which had flourished in the 1970s. For example, the wag~e indexation 
scheme in Denmark was suspended in 1982 for 3 years, and subsequently suspended until 
1987 (OECD, 1986, p.14) .. Wage indexation was suspended in Belgium between 1982 
and 1986 and in Luxembourg between 1982 and 1983 (Van Ginneken, 1987, p.395). 
Where full or partial indexation arrangements have remained in place, such as in France, 
Greece and Spain, there has been a general trend away from retrospective indexation in 
favour of ex ante indexation (i.e. wages ,ar,e adjusted on the basis of expected price 
increases, and sometimes protected via catch-up clauses). This arrangement may be 
satisfactory during a period of falling inflation but is potentially very damaging 
economically if price inflation accelerates unexpectedly. 
Whefie does New Zealand fit into this pattern? Clearly, the role of the state in the 
process of wage deteiinination in this country, and the overall policy framework wilhin 
which bargaining occurs, has changed significantly during the past £ew decades. Up until 
the 1960s New Zealand would have been grouped with Australia in the category of 
countries with a founal incomes policy based on an independent arbitral body which 
conducted fegular (i.e. annual or biennial) national wage hearings. From the early 1970s 
until the mid-1980s it moved into the ~category of counuies with temporary, ad hoc state 
intervention or short-lived wage accords. Since late 1984., New Zealand has joined those 
countries with regular, ~centralised discussions on wages policy and related issues through 
the vehicle of the Tripartite Wage Conference (TWC). Howev,er, the TWC is a much less 
important consultative and coordinating body than its countetparts in Austria and Norway. 
It has no legal power or effective control over the bargaining behaviour of employers and 
unions. And in its thfee and a half years of operations it has not reached a single 
agreement on a wage guideline, though some attempts to do so were made in late 1984 
and mid-1985. Moreover, there seems little prospect, given the current economic climate 
and dominance of market-liberal thinking, that its role will be greatly enhanced during the 
next few years. Nevertheless, the TWC could become an important vehicle for 
coordinating economic policies and facilitating union and employer input into government 
decision-making given a collective desifie for this to occur. 
In summary, it has been argued in this section that incomes policies of various kinds 
have remained important instruments of macroeconomic management during the 1980s in 
a large number of OECD countries. Nevertheless, they afe undoubtedly less fashionable 
than was the case during the 1970s and most governments are today relying primarily on 
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies to control inflation and c~eate the conditions for 
stable economic growth. The changes in macroeconomic policy since the late 1970s are 
obviously due to the influence of monetarist and supply-side theories (and the 
simultaneous demise of Keynesian economics), together with the difficulties of 
implementing incomes policies successfully. In particular, governments and employers 
have been dissatisfied with the general failure of unions to abide by the te1ans of negotiated 
policies, and the tendency for unions to demand substantial policy concessions in return 
for their cooperation on the wages front 
Whether there will be a greater reliance on incomes policies during the coming decade 
is hard to predict, but it is unlikely. Rather, governments will probably place an ev~en 
greater emphasis on labour market reforn1 and other supply-side measufes with fotnaal 
incomes policies being resorted to only sporadicaHy to cope with short-te11n economic 
crises. As for the corporatist arrangements in Scandinavia and Austria, it seems likely 
that these will continue in the meantime, but if the general trend to decentralised 
bargaining gathers momentum they will doubtless be more difficult to sustain (Calmfors 
and Driffill, 1987; Lash, 1985; Marks, 1986). Of course, such predictions could be 
rendered utterly false if the world economy suffers a series of inflationary shocks of the 
kind experienced in the 1970s or if there is a major increase in distributional dissent, 
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labour militancy and bargaining intensity. In these circumstances incomes policies might 
again become politically attractive. 
Labour market reform and the quest fo:r wage nexibility 
The depressed ~character of labour market conditions dwing the 1980s and the protracted 
period of high unemployment which has afflicted most OECD countries during the 1980s 
has led to a widespfead concern with the question of labour market flexibility. In brief, it 
has been argued, certainly by economists of a neo-classical persuasion, that the high 
unemployment of the 1980s is the product not of inadequate aggregate demand but of rigid 
industrial relations institutions, comprehensive employment security arrangements and 
inflexible wages. As evidence for this it is claimed that unemployment levels have been 
significantly lower in countries with apparently flexible labour markets, such as Japan, 
Switzerland and the United States, than in countries with arguably more inflexible labour 
markets, like Britain, heland, the Netherlands and Spain (Piore, 1986). Despite the fact 
that the theoretical and ~empirical basis of such claims remains in serious doubt, many 
OECD countries, including New Zealand, have in recent years embarked on reform 
programmes designed to "free-up" the labour market 
The nature of these refoitns has differed from country to country depending on the 
existing institutional and regulatory fram~ework, legal traditions, the political and 
industrial stfength of the union movemen~ the perceived magnitude of the economic crisis 
and the ideological sympathies of the party in power. For example, the changes to labour 
market regulation in Britain and New Zealand have been substantial. By contrast, only 
minor policy adjustments have occurred in counrries with a strong corporatist tradition. 
Generally ~ng, attempts at increasing labour market flexibility have focussed on two 
kinds of changes. 
F'irst, there have been various measur~es introduced throughout the ~OE~CD to enhance 
labour flexibility (i.e. the quality., adaptability and mobility of the workfofce). These have 
included: 
i) policies to improve post-compulsory education and the range of training (and 
retraining) programmes; 
ii) work-study programmes designed to ease the transition from school to work; 
iii) remedial programmes to improve basic numeracy and literacy, and enhance work 
attitudes and habits; 
iv) job transition training for workers displaoed by plant closures; 
v) improvements in placement services and vocational counselling; 
vi) mobility allowances and relocation assistance for people needing to move from one 
region to another to fmd suitable work; 
vii) more flexible public housing policies to facilitate geographical mobility,; and 
viii) changes to occupational licensing to reduce the existing barriers to entry (Casey and 
Bruche, 1985). 
Second, ther~e have been a series of policy initiatives in c~ertain OECD countries to 
increase the flexibility (downwards) of real wages and non-wage labour costs. These have 
included: 
i) measures to reduce union bargaining rights and union coverage; 
ii) policies to encourage the decentralisation of wage bargaining in both the public and 
private sectors; 0 
iii) measures to enhance competition in labour and product markets, in particular the 
deregulation of highly unionized industries; 
iv) reductions in mandatory non-wage labour benefits; 
0 
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the femoval of certain constraints on hiring and firing, in particular the weakening 
of job security provisions; 
the failure to adjust the statutory minimum wage in line with changes in the CPI 
and/or the abandonment of solidaristic wage policies; 
modifications to youth rates to facilitate greater downward wage flexibility; 
cuts in unemployment benefits and more restrictive eligibility criteria; and 
policies to encourage more flexible work practices (i.e. with respect to hours, shift-
work, part-time employment, temporary work and limited-duration contracts). 
Quite apart from governmental measures of this nature, many employers have 
exploited the opportunities provided by the economic recession of the 1980s and the 
unions' weaker bargaining position to restore certain managerial plierogatives which had 
been lost during the 1960s and 1970s and to incfease their control over the workplace (e.g. 
with respect to manning levels, payment systems, hours of work, rostering, shift work, 
the deployment of labour within the enterprise, the introduction of new technology etc) 
(see Crouch, 1986). In addition, employers in a large number of OECD countries hav,e 
taken an active interest in Japanese models of personnel management and industrial 
relations and have sought where possible to adopt Japanese practices (e.g. the creation of 
company unions, company loyalties, employee participation in low-level decision 
making, flexible work groups etc). 
The position of organised labour has been further weakened by the changing structure 
of employment within advanced industrialised democracies: the diminishing importance of 
industries with a high level of unionisation, the growth of the service sector, the rise in 
part-time work, temporary work and self-employment, and the general decline in the size 
of individual enterprises and work-places (see Brown, 1986}. The impact of all these 
structural, managerial and policy changes has been to place the union movement in a 
much weaker and more vulnerable position than was the case during the 1960s and 1970s. 
The pattern internationally, of course, is very uneven. For the most part, the union 
movements in the Nordic countries and Austria, and to a lesser extent the Low countries, 
France, Italy and West Getrnany, have remained relatively unscathed. Against this, the 
trade unions have be_,en more severely affected in Britain and North America. In the United 
States, for example, union coverage has fallen significantly in recent years, collective 
bargaining continues to decline in importance, many unions have been forced into 
concession bargaining (especially during the early 1980s) and the extent of pattern 
bargaining appears to have diminished (Cullen, 1985; Edwards and Podgursky, 1986). 
Likewise in Britain the union movement has suffered some notable setbacks under the 
Thatcher Government (Brown, 1986; McBride, 1986; Soskice, 1984). Union mernbership 
fell by almost 2 million between 1980 and 1984, largely as a result of the 
disproportionate number of highly unionised manufacturing plants which closed during 
this period (Kelly, 1987, p.275). A gradualist programme of industrial relations law 
reform- the Employment Act {1980), the Employment Act (1982), and Lhe Trade Union 
Act (1984)- has challenged some of the main foundations of trade union power (Gregory, 
1985). For example, civil immunities have been withdra\).'n from many trade union 
activities, including political, syn1pathy and inter-union strikes, secondary picketing and 
all sLrikes which have not been endorsed by a secret ballot. The sanctioning of closed 
shops requires regular ballots and an 85 percent majority in favour. Procedures for 
establishing trade union recognition and enforcing industry ~collective agreements on non-
union firms have been abolished. Clauses in subcontracts which require only the 
~employment of union labour have been prohibited. In addition, wage councils (which set 
legal minimum wages in various industries) have been abo'lished, as has the Fair Wages 
Resolution requiring firms supplying government services to pay fair wages. Final.ly, 
there have been important changes Lo public sector pay-fixing arrangements and the 
~Government has won some notable v.ictories in its disputes with public sector employees, 
above all against the miners in 1985. 
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Despite these legislative impediments and the hostile political and economic 
environment, the union movement has proved to be remarkably resilienl According to 
recent evidence which has come to light, for example, over two-thirds of British workers 
remain cov~ered by collective bargaining arrangements, the ov~erall number of shop 
stewards actually increased between 1980 and 1984, and there has been no major change 
during the 1980s in the incidence of joint shop steward committees and inter-
establishment combine committees (Kelly, 1987, pp.275-276). On the other hand, there 
has been a substantial decline in the proportion of establishments with closed shop 
arrangements and the number of workers covered by them, and of course the political 
influence of organised labour has declined massively. From being major actors in the 
corridors of power in the 1970s, union leaders are now almost completely excluded from 
the policy-making process. 
It is unlikely that union movements in other OECD countries will be faced in the 
immediate future with such a concerted and detennined attack on their rights and power 
base as has occurr~ed during 'the Thatcher years in Britain. Nevertheless, the New Right is 
now influential in many western countries, including Australia and New Zealand 
(Dabscheck, 1987). Hence, irrespective of the political complexion of the government in 
power, there are likely to be continuing pressures for labour market deregulation .. In New 
Zealand debate will probably centre on the provisions in the Labour Relations Act r~elating 
to minimum union size, union membership, contestability, and national awards. But it is 
also likely that there will be pressures to undennine job security provisions, health and 
safety provisions and income security arrangements (i .. e. unemployment benefits, sickness 
benefits, accident compensation etc). Doubtless, too, any government moves to require 
greater worker participation and industrial democracy will be vigorously resisted. 
The Calmfors-Dirf'fill thesis and the m·erits or decentralis·ed wage 
bargaining 
As noted in the previous section, the 1980s have witnessed a general trend towards the 
decentralisation of wage bargaining within the OECD, encouraged for the most part by 
government policy. The rationale behind this move rests on the assumption that 
decentralised bargaining will enhance the efficiency of the labour market and increase wage 
flexibility (i.e. both in teuns of real and !ielative wages). This in tum, it is argued, will 
improve economic perfonnance with lower unemployment and faster productivity growth. 
Whether such an analysis is coroect remains highly contentious. It is by no means certain 
whether decentralised bargaining at the plant or ~enterprise level is either a necessary or 
sufficient condition for wage flexibility; nor is it clear whether a high degree of wage 
.flexibility is a necessary or sufficient condition for achieving desi~able macroeconomic 
outcomes. 
An analysis by Grubb, Jackman and Layard (1983) indicates that countries with 
relatively decentralised bargaining arrangements have markedly different lev~els of wage 
flexibility . In Japan and Switzerland both real and nominal wages aJie relatively flexible 
whereas in the United Kingdom there is a substantial degree of Jieal wage rigidity and in 
the United States a high degree of nominal wage rigidity. By contrast, a number of 
countries with relatively centralised bargaining arrangements, such as Austria, Finland, 
Sweden and the Netherlands, exhibit a substantial degree of nominal and real wage 
flexibility. Interestingly, New Zealand is among those countries which, according to 
·Grubb, Jackman and La yard, have a significant degree of wage flexibility; yet its economic 
perfonnance for the past few decades has been relatively poor. 
Over the years there have been many attempts to assess the relative efficiency of 
different pay-fixing systems and explore the relationship betw·een the degree of bargaining 
centralisation (or coordination) and economic per£onnance (as measured by a range of 
indicators) (for instance Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Calmfors and Driffill, 1987; Castles, 
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1987; Crouch, 1985; McCallum, 1983; Schmitter, 1981; and Tarantelli, 1983). In 
general, such studies indicate that the perfot tuance of. O~CD countries. wi~ corporatist 
industrial relations systems (i.e. a high lev,el of oentrahsallon and coordination) has been 
superior to those with liberal systems (i.e. decentralised bargaining an~ very limited 
central coordination). Crouch (1985) shows, for example, that on the basts of a study of 
19 OECD countries, corporatist systems performed better with respect to industrial 
conflict (1965-80), inflation (mid-l960s to mid-1970s), peak inflation rates during the mid 
1970s and the misery index (i.e. the swn of the rates of inflation and unemployment). 
Broadly similar results were obtained by Castles (1987). For example, according to 
Castles, unemployment as measured in three separate periods ( 1960-73, 197 4-79, and 
1980-84) was consistently lower in countries with corporatist systems (see Table 1). 
Castles's fesults also showed a negative association between coi])Oratist arrangements and 
inflation, at least during the period 1974-79, and a positive relationship between 
coiJX>ratism and total governm~ent outlays. On the other hand, the rate of economic 
growth does not seem to be related to a country's industrial relations system. 
Table 2 provides an overview of economic developments in 18 ,OECD countries using 
two measures: the misery index and the happiness index. It should be noted that the 
misery index is nounally generated by adding the absolute values of unemployment and 
inflation while the happiness index is calculated on the basis of employment and social 
wage indicators. However, in this instanoe the indexes in Table 2 have been compiled 
from the rank orders in Table l; the appropriate rank orders hav~e been added and then 
reranked (Castles, 1987, p.389). Again the results show corporatist industrial relations 
systems in a favourable light: there is a negative association betw,een ~corporatism and the 
misery index and a positive relationship between corporatism and the happiness index. 
Indeed, only in those countries with centralised wage bargaining arrangements, such as 
Austria, Norway and Sweden, were the ·main objectives of the union mov~ement- in tetnls 
of relatively full employment and high social wage levels - achieved on a consistent basis. 
By contrast, among the countries which obtained a low ranking on the happiness index 
were Britain, Canada, and the United States, all thr,ee with decentralised bargaining 
systems .. Note, too, that New Zealand's relative perfotanance, as revealed in Tables 1 and 
2, has been reasonably mediocre and on the whole has deteriorated since the mid-1970s. 
Only with respect to employment (1960-79) and economic growth (1980-84) has New 
Zealand ranked near the top of the international league. 
Such analyses are, of course, open to numerous objections. The desirability of high 
levels of government expenditure is strongly challenged in many quarters. The relative 
importance of price stability and full employ.ment. remains in dispute . And all analyses of 
this nature are crucially dependent on the criteria used to measure the degree of 
centralisation and the categories into which particular countries are put. As Table 3 
shows, various scholars using different criteria have in recent years produced some 
strikingly different results, at least with respect to particu.lar countries (e.g. Belgium, 
Ge1 many, the Netherlands and Switzerland). 
Quite apart from this, the sugg~estion that centralised bargaining arrangements are 
generally preferable to dcc,entralised ones continues to be sttongly contested by many 
economists. As already noted, it is argued that the best perfo1 ruing economies in recent 
years, most notably Japan and Switzerland, have decenttalised industrial r~elations systems, 
and that one of the highest employment growth ~ates during the past few decades has 
occurred in the United States, also a country with decentralised bargaining. Is there any 
way of reconciling such views with the claitns that corporatist solutions are best? After 
all, on theoretical grounds both sides appear to have a strong case. Decentralised 
bargaining, arguably, enables wages to reflccttnore accurntely ~changes in productivity and 
market conditions at the enterprise lev~el. Likewise, centralised bargaining by large 
encompassing organizations provides the opportunity for wages to be adjusted in response 
to economy-wide developments and external shocks, and also encournges the bargaining 
Table 1: Rank orders of inflation, unemployment, economic growth and total government outlays in 18 countries in the periods 1960-73, 
1974-79 and 1980-84 
Countries: Inflation I Unemployment 2 Economic Growth3 Government Outlays4 
1960-73 1974-79 1980-84 1960-73 1974-79 1980-84 1960-73 1974-79 1980-84 1'960-73 1974-79 1980-84 
Australia 4 12 9 10 12 9 14 16 8 14 16 16 
Austria 6 3 5 7 3 5 6 2 5 3 6 9 
Belgium 4 5 6 14 13 17 3 9 10 9 7 4 
Canada 1 8 8 16 17 14 7 7 15 13 12 12 
Denmark 17 14 10 5 14 12 9 12 6 10 4 3 
Finland 15 13 12 13 9 7 2 9 2 15 14 13 
France 8 11 15 7 10 10 3 4 15 4 10 8 
(iennany 3 2 3 3 7 8 11 5 10 5 5 10 
Ireland 16 16 17 17 18 18 8 2 9 8 8 5 
Italy 10 18 18 17 15 14 3 7 10 11 11 6 
Japan 18 10 1 5 5 1 1 5 1 18 l8 17 
Netherlands 11 4 4 4 11 16 9 11 18 1 1 2 
... 
= 
New Zealand5 12 15 16 1 2 6 18 18 4 12 13 14 
.... 
'" .. 
Norway 13 7 13 7 4 3 11 1 4 7 3 7 
Cl 
., 
Sweden 8 9 14 10 5 4 13 14 6 2 2 1 
... 
-· 
Switzerland 6 l 2 1 1 1 15 17 10 17 17 18 
= 
= 
United Kingdom 14 17 11 10 8 12 17 14 17 6 9 11 
., 
-
United States 1 6 6 15 16 11 16 12 14 16 15 15 
., 
tD 
.. 
Cl) 
~ 
ft» 
n 
Notes: The rankings are based on assumed union preferences. This means that low unemployment and inflation score highly (ie low numbers) ... ~-·  
as do high growth and government outlays. " Cl) 
1.. A¥ea&e ag.ouai y.eit-Ul-y.ear percentage. change in ·consu.mer price index. 
:2.·. ·. · _· · . _.: _- . ~··'.· _:~ · .. ·asa·puceatapofdlo181allabourfome. 
• 
t 
, 
I 
:&~ A ... ·--'!.::,.,_;.,_,_._· _ ·. · ._.._in.18116DPper.capha l . ...,. I 4. IAWIJit :.·.:·· 1 aa.~· CIIIlaysrAaova;,.· a~~~•~•·e.•··:lti 88JKI1CIIIIII8ofGDP. ~·;;;[ •• '] c--ftl 
s. oo ...... ·-···ill New lftlland from Houle ofRepesratatives. Public . 
~-P181Cit CudiB {1987) p. 314. '1: 
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Table 2: Rank orders for misery and happiness indexes 1960-73, 1974-79, 1980-84. 
Countries 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Gennany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Rank order 
correlation with 
neocorporatism 
M.isery Index 
1960-73 1974-79 1980-84 
5 
3 
10 
9 
13 
17 
6 
1 
18 
16 
14 
6 
3 
12 
10 
2 
15 
8 
-0.23 
13 
2 
9 
14 
16 
10 
II 
3 
18 
17 
6 
6 
8 
4 
5 
1 
14 
12 
7 
3 
14 
11 
II 
9 
15 
4 
18 
17 
1 
10 
11 
5 
7 
2 
16 
6 
-0 . 61 ** -0.51* 
H'appiness Index 
1960-73 1974-79 1980-84 
13 
3 
11 
17 
8 
15 
4 
2 
14 
15 
11 
1 
6 
7 
5 
10 
9 
18 
-0.53* 
16 
3 
10 
17 
8 
13 
10 
4 
14 
14 
12 
4 
6 
1 
1 
8 
7 
18 
16 
3 
13 
17 
4 
10 
5 
5 
14 
10 
5 
5 
10 
2 
1 
9 
14 
17 
-0.67** -0.72** 
Correlations are Speannan's Rho. * = significance at. .05 level; ** = significance at .01 
leveL 
The misery index generally measures the combined rates of inflation and unemployment, 
while the happiness index measures the ~extent of full employment together with the 
extent of total gov~crnment outlays. The indexes in the above table, however, have been 
constructed by adding the appropriate rank orders in Table 1 and then reranking. 
Source: Francis Castl~es (1987) p.389. 
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Table 3: Rank orderings of countries ~according to the degre.e of centralisation 
Calmfors & Driffill 
).Austria 
2.Norway 
3.Sweden 
4.Denmark 
5.Finland 
6.Getu.aany 
7 .Netherlands 
8.Belgium 
9New 'Zealand 
lO.Australia 
ll.France 
12.Britain 
13.Italy 
14Japan 
15.Switzerland 
l6.US 
17.Canada 
Schmitter 
l.Austria 
2.Norway 
Sweden 
4.Denmark 
Finland 
6.Netherlands 
?.Belgium 
8.~Gennany 
9 . Switzerland 
IO.US 
ll.Canada 
12.France 
13.Canada 
14.Italy 
Cameron 
l.Sweden 
2.Norway 
3.Austria 
4.Belgium 
5.Finland 
6.Denmark 
7 .Netherlands 
8.Gennany 
9.Britain 
lO.Australia 
ll.Switzerland 
12Jtaly 
13.Canada 
14.US 
15.France 
16Japan 
Source: Calmfors and DriffJ.ll (1987) p.46. 
Bl th y . 
l.Austria 
2.Norway 
3 .. Sweden 
4.Denmark 
5.Finland 
6.New Zealand 
7 .. Australia 
8.Geuuany 
9.Belgium 
1 O .Netherlands 
llJapan 
12.France 
13.Britain 
14.Italy 
15.US 
16.Canada 
Bruno-Sachs 
l.Austria 
2.Getanany 
3.Netherlands 
4.Norway 
Sweden 
6.S wi tzerland 
?.Denmark 
8.Finland 
9.Belgium 
lOJapan 
ll.New aaland 
12.Britain 
13.France 
14.Italy 
15.Australia 
16.Canada 
17.US 
parties to consider a wider range of interests during the course of their negotiations. In 
short, it facilitates the internalization of the externalities associated with wage increases. 
A recent contribution to the debate by Calmfors and Driffill (1987) offers a possible 
solution to this conundrum. In a fascinating paper, these economists argue that there are 
two desirable types of bargaining arrangements (i.e. from the perspective of achieving real 
wage restraint and positive macroeconomic outcomes): either a heavily centralised system 
or a highly decentralised system. Bargaining systems which faJI somewhere between these 
models are, in general, economically inferior. What this means, in other words, is that 
there is a hump-shaped relationship between real wages (and unemployment) and the 
degree of centralisation., rather than a monotonic relationship 'whereby increased 
centralisation reduces real wages (see Figure 1). As Calmfors and Driffill (p.2) note, such 
a hypothesis is consistent with Olson's (1982) contention that organised interests are the 
most damaging and disruptive economically when they are not sufficiently encompassing 
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to bear a substantial portion of the external costs of their behaviour and yet are powerful 
enough to alter economic outcomes. 
Calmfors and Driffill take as their defmition of c~entrnlisation "the extent of inter-union 
and inter-employer cooperation in wage bargaining with lhe other side" (p.5), or more 
particularly the "extent of ~coordination both within and between various central 
organisations" (p.6). Hence, they reject definitions based on the level at which wag~e­
fixi.ng occurs, the degree of associational monopoly and unity enjoyed by the central union 
and employer organisations, and the negotiating rights and powers vested with the peak 
organisations (Visser, 1983). On the basis of their definition they seek to rank 17 OECD 
countries (using an ordinal tather than a cardinal scale).. As Table 3 shows, they rank 
Austria, Norway and Sweden as having the most centralised bargaining systems and 
Switzerland, the United States and ~Canada as having the least centralised. Belgium, New 
Zealand and Australia have the rather dubious distinction of being ranked in the 
intetJnediate position. 
Figure 1: The hump-shape hypothesis 
real 
wage 
~centralisation 
Having ranked these 17 countries and grouped them into 3 categories - centralised, 
intennediate and decentralised- Calmfors and Dri.ffiU evaluated the relative macroeconomic 
perfonnance of the 3 groups during 2 time periods, 1963-73 and 1974-85. Eight 
performance indicators were used including unemployment, the change in unemployment, 
the employment population, the change in the ,employment population, the Okun "misery 
index", and so forth (pp.47A-47B). The r~esul'ts of this analysis (together with various 
other tests) strongly supported their hump-shape hypothesis: the best perlottnances wefe 
achieved by the most c,entralised and decentralised ~economies, the worst by the 
intermediate group. Interestingly, the hump-shaped fetation was :most striking with regard 
to the changes in employment perfonnance between the periods before and a£ter the frrst 
oil shock. At the same time, no evidence was found to support the proposition that there 
is a monotonic relationship between the degree of cen,tralisation and macroeconomic 
perfonnance. 
Calmfors and Driffill seek to explore why it is that other researchers have found strong 
evidence of a monotonic relation between centtalisation (or corporatism) and economic 
outcomes (especially the degree of real-wage moderation). Their conclusion, in brief, is 
that the classification systems which have been adopted have been flawed and that certain 
countries, most notably Japan and Switzerland, have sometimes been placed in the wrong 
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category. In addition, the results have been affected by the particular time periods chosen 
(see pp.14-20). 
Calmfors and Driffill are well awar~e that their own analysis is open to question, and 
that the theoretical framework which they develop to account for their results is 
incomplete (pp.20-38). For example, they acknowJ,edge that their analysis focuses 
primarily on the relation between centralisation and the aggregate real wage and that they 
fail to give sufficient attention to the flexibility of relative wages in different industrial 
relations systems. But there are other problems as well. 
First, their ranking of certain countries is puzzling. It seems rather doubtful whether, 
according to their definition of centralisation, Australia should be ranked lower than New 
haland. Indeed, it is arguable that during the period of indexation (1974-81) and the Wage 
Accord Marks I and II (1983-87) Australia exhibited a high degree of ~centralisation, 
comparable perhaps to that pr~evailing in Austria and Norway. Similarly, it is uncertain 
why Britain., which ,according to ·Crouch has the "most decentralised union movement in 
the industrial world" (1985, p.128)., is located ahead of fiv,e other countries (see 'Table 3). 
Second, and related to this, Calmfors and Driffill appear to hav.e ignored the crucial role 
which incomes policies have played in a great many OECD countries during the past few 
decades. In the case of New Zealand, incomes policies of one kind or another were in €orce 
for most of the period between 1971 and 1984. Does this not imply a high level of 
~centralisation or coordination? 
Third, little consideration is given to the reasons for the variable economic 
perfo1 1nance of countries within the thr~ee categories identified. For instance, economic 
outcomes in the countries grouped within the decentralised category (France, Britain, Italy, 
Japan, Switz,erland, the United States and Canada) have varied significantly in the past 
decade or so, the British ~experience being markedly worse than that of Switzerland and 
Japan. Afe these variable outcomes r~elated to their different labour market institutions or 
·to other factors? 
Fourth, it appears that in assessing the degree of bargaining centralisation, ~Calmfors 
and Drifful have concentrated primarily on pay fixing arrangements in the private sector. 
But this is unsatisfactory. Most OECD countries have a large public sector, and 
bargaining outcomes in this sector often hav~e a significant impact on trends in the private 
sec~or. Moreover, pay fixing arrangements in the public sector are generally more 
centralised than in the private sector. C~ertainly this has been the case in New Zealand 
where for many years most public servants have received uniform annual g~enetal 
adjustments in their pay rates. Although such arrangements afe in the process of radical 
change, the degree of bargaining ~centralisation in the public sector up to now raises further 
questions about the accuracy of placing New Zealand in the intennediate category. 
Finally, just as highly decentralised and frngmented bargaining is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for ensuring desirable macroeconomic outcomes, much the same 
can be said for centralised bargaining. The experience of Denmark, for example, has 
differed substantially from that of Austria and Norway. The ·central point, then, is that 
institutional arrangements must not be looked at in isolation. lt is also necessary to 
consider a host of socio-political variables. H~ence, decentralised bargaining may yield 
favourable economic fesults when t.he union .movement is weak, union density low, 
worker deference high, conflict over income shares limited and so forth. By contrast, if 
the union movement is powerful, if union density is high, if there are strongly held 
notions of comparativ~e wage justice and vigorous collectivist traditions, and if employees 
show liule deference and readily partake in strike .action, then decentralised bargaining may 
yield very disappointing results. But so might a centralised system. 
What implications does this discussion have for New Zealand? If tbe ~Calmfors -
DriffilJ hypothesis is valid, and if New Zealand is indeed uncomfortably located in the 
intennediate category towards the top of the hump, then ~clearly this means that, other 
things being equal, the country's long-teun economic perfonnance is likely to be inferior 
to those OECD countries with highly centralised or highly decentralised industrial 
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relations systems. And this implies that it would be to New Zealand's advantag~e either to 
press ahead with auempts to decentralise wage bargaining to the plant or company level or 
alternatively introduce a centralised, coordinated system along Austrian or Scandinavian 
lines. Note too that if Calm£ors and Driffill are correct, tinkering, fme tuning or marginal 
changes in one direction or another will not be enough; only radical surgery can be 
expected to bring major economic gains (pp.39-40). 
The question, of course, is which direction would be best? Easton (1986, 1988) argues 
that New Zealand should adopt a .more centralised appfoach. He maintains that this would 
be consistent with New Zealanders' preference for social cooperation and that such a 
system is likely to be superior to a highly decentralised model in a small, open economy 
(1988, p.78). But he recognizes that there are problems in moving in such a difiection . 
For one thing, both the Business Roundtable and the Employers Federation continue to 
press £or substantial deregulation of the labour market and the removal of various union 
rights and privileges. The Business Roundtable, for example, is strongly opposed to 
oompulsory unionism (in any fonn), it rejects lhe concept of national awards, and it sees 
no justification in the retention of the Labour Court and the Arbitration Commission. 
Under the proposals bargaining would occur mainly at the plant or enterprise level and the 
union structures would be radically altered. The Employers Federation, partly because of 
its broader constituency, is more pragmatic in its approach and is prepared to tolerate the 
continuation of the award system and a separate jurisdictional arrangement for labour 
relations. Nevertheless, it favours voluntary unionism and an ~end to the fequirement for 
unions to have a minimum of 1000 members. It also advocates greater bargaining 
decentralisation, but sees merit in bargaining at the industry, rather than the plant, level in 
som~e instances. Hence, neither the Business Roundtable nor the Employers Federation 
would support any move 1:0 a greater degree of centralisation in wage-fixing. 
The position of the union movement, on the other hand, is less clear. Some unions 
favour centralised bargaining, partly as a means of increasing the political influence of the 
union movement and partly because of the risks associated with major changes in 
bargaining structures. Other unions, how~ever, believe that political and economic 
circumstances are such that there is no option but to move to more decentralised 
bargaining arrnngcments and that the union movement should exploit the current 
opportunities to restructure and gear itself so that it can be effective in the new 
environment. Given this division of opinion, it seems most unlikely that the Council of 
Trade Unions would be willing and able to give strong support to Easton's proposals. 
Irrespective of this, there are many practical difficulties associated with the 
centralisation option. What kind of institutional arrangements would be best - the 
Austrian, Norwegian or Australian model? What enfolicement mechanisms would be 
required? How would the Employers Federation and t.he Council of Trade Unions be 
strengthened, and what powers would they be given with respect to claim fouuulation, 
negotiating rights, the calling of strikes and lockouts and so forth? In view of all these 
problems I do not believe that a significant shift in the direction of greater centralisation is 
feasible (Boston, 1986, pp.9-11 ). 
This appears to leave only one option, namely to decentralise the process of wage-
fixing as much as possible. But this option also presents difficulties. Bringing about 
changes in the pattern of industrial relations is not easy, as recent developm~ents both in 
New Zealand and elsewhere testify.. Moreover, I am sceptical as to whether a radical 
decentralisation of wage bargaining in New Zealand would necessarily yield significant 
macroeconomic gains. It is not satisfactory simply to point to the favourable perfonnance 
of certain economies with decentralised pay fixing like Japan., Switzerland and the United 
States. Each of these countries is very different from New Zealand in terms of legal 
traditions, political history, union density and organisation, cultural no11us and economic 
structure. More relevant for comparative purposes are Britain and Ireland; but neither of 
these economies have ,much 'fO commend them, apart perhaps from the good ~GOP growth 
experienced by Britain in recent years~ 
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Now it might be objected that New Zealand's perfonnance could be greatly improved if 
a move to decentralised bargaining was combined with a general assault on union rights, 
worker protection, income security provisions, and so forth. This, in short, is the 
strategy of the New Right The aim here would be to minimise the role of the state in the 
economy, strengthen the managerial prerogatives of employers, reduce the political 
influence of the union movemen~ and dramatically lower union coverage. I do not know 
what the ~economic consequences of such a strategy would be. It is certainly possibl~e that 
it would result in faster productivity growth, greater real-wage flexibility and higher 
employment growth. But it would be at a significant cost in tet1ns of social rights and 
distributive justice. Consequently, I do not favour such an approach .. 
Where does this leave us then? As in most areas of public policy it leaves us seeking 
better empirical data, deeper analysis and, for the most part, muddling through as best we 
can. It also leaves us hoping that the Calmfors-Driffill thesis is wrong, or at least that 
New Zealand does not, after all, occupy such an unfavourable position on their 
centralisation scale. 
Conclusion 
The main points of this paper can be summarised v~ery simply. First, there has been a 
general change in the pattern of macroeconomic management within the OECD during the 
past decade. This has seen gr~eater emphasis placed on restrictive monetary and fiscal 
policies and a corresponding decline in direct state intervention in the wage-fixing process. 
Nevertheless, corporatist incomes policies are still a central feature of macroeconomic 
policy in Scandinavia and Austria, and statutory incomes policies continue to be used 
from time to time by governments in many OECD countries. Second, there has been a 
widespread trend towards the decentralisation of wage bargaining during the 1980s with 
many governments, including those in Britain, France., New Zealand and more Iiecently 
Australia, making policy changes ~o facilitate this process. More broadly, there has been 
a quest within much of the OECD for labour market reform and greater wage flexibility. 
Third, there is a continuing debate concerning the relative merits of different wage-fixing 
systems. Within this context the recent contribution by ~Calmfors and Driffill provides 
plenty of food for thought. Finally, despite the easing of inflationary pfessures since the 
early 1980s and the recent fall in unemployment in many OECD countries, questions 
relating to the operation of the labour market and the appropriate role of the state in the 
regulation of employment and industrial relations seem destined to remain high on the 
political agenda. This will certainly be the case in New Zealand where the Business 
Roundtable appears unwilling to settle for anything less than a radical reshaping of the 
en tire social and political order. 
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